On July 13, 2023, the Member of Parliament for North Tongu, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa disclosed that an Accra High Court ruled in his case against the secretary to the board of trustees of the National Cathedral of Ghana, Rev Victor Kusi Boateng.
According to him, the ruling stated that there is a lack of transparency and elements of criminality in the way and manner the pastor operates separately as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi.
In a summary of the court’s ruling shared by the MP, the court said that besides the fact that two separate personalities are proven, “the way the two identities were used does not suggest a simple case of two different names, but rather two independent and totally separate identities to conceal applicant’s dealings in a manner that was not obvious, until the investigations and publications of 1st Respondent.”
The applicant in this case was Victor Kusi Boateng who approached the court to cause the respondent (Member of Parliament for North Tongu, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa) to stop making critical publications about him.
The court added: “Applicant’s assertion that the use of two names in the manner he has done is not a crime under our laws is misconceived, as the two identities were used in a pattern of duplicity depicting a lack of transparency and this conduct borders on criminality.”
GhanaWeb has now sighted the full ruling of the high court, which was presided over by Justice Barbara Tetteh-Charway.
Below are the reasons why the court ruled that Kusi Boateng and Adu Gyamfi are two different people according to court documents:
Firstly, the court notes that the applicant who describes himself as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng in the instant application, stated in paragraph 6 of his affidavit in support that “the 1st respondent in January 2023, commenced various social media publications and mainstream engagements in respect of the dealings of the applicant in his capacity as trustee of the National Cathedral Board and JNS Talent Centre Ltd.”
The court further notes that per Exhibit IB which is the Regulations of the National Cathedral of Ghana, which was incorporated on 18 July 2019, one Victor Kusi Boateng, has been named as a member of the Executive Council. Further, per Exhibit 21. which is a copy of the company profile of JNS Talent Centre Limited, which was incorporated on 14 September 2015, one Kwabena Adu Gyamfi, has been named as one of the directors of JNS Talent Centre.
It is significant to note that there is nothing on the face of Exhibit 1B, the Regulations of the National Cathedral that suggests, remotely, that Victor Kusi Boateng, who is named as a member of the Executive Council of the Board of the National Cathedral is also known as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi. Neither is there anything on the face of Exhibit 21, to suggest that Kwabena Adu Gyamfi, who is named as one of the directors of JNS Talent Centre is also known as Victor Kusi Boateng,
But for the applicant’s description of himself in this application as Kwabena Adi Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng and his statement in paragraph 6 of his affidavit in support to the effect that respondent’s investigations were in respect of his dealings in his capacity as trustee of the National Cathedral and JNS Talent Centre, one would have had no basis to suspect that Victor Kusi Boateng who is named in the Regulations of the National Cathedral as a member of the Executive Council is the same as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi who is named as one of the Directors of INS Talent Centre Ltd the recipient of the amount of GHS2,600,000.00 which was disbursed out of public funds.
It can thus be inferred from the facts above stated, that although the applicant describes himself in this application as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng, the applicant uses the name Kwabena Adu Gyamfi independent of the name Victor Kusi Boateng for the purpose of concealing his true identity.
Further evidence of the applicant’s independent and separate use of the two names by which he describes himself in this application, can be found in Exhibit 5, for example. Exhibit 5, is a letter written to the Hon. Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa by the Ghana Revenue Authority based on his request for information pursuant to the Right to Information Act, on the two distinct Taxpayer Identification Numbers belonging to the same individual. The GRA’s response on the details of the owners of the two distinct Taxpayer Identification Numbers is instructive;
i. P…………X is registered for Victor Kusi Boateng
Date of birth 07/09/1971
Mother’s maiden name: Agnes Attah
Date of application: 13th August 2013
Identification Information: Driver’s license
ii. P Xisregistered for Kwabena Adu Gyamfi
Date of Birth: 30/12/1969
Mother’s maiden name: Yaa Gyamfua
Date of application: 15th March 2016
Identification information: Passport
The above shows that the applicant who describes himself as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng possesses two Taxpayer Identification Numbers in his two names; one in the name of Kwabena Adu Gyamfi and the other in the name of Victor Kusi Boateng. It reveals further that the two names used by the applicant represent two separate and distinct identities because, from the records of the ORA, Victor Kusi Boateng was born on ih September 1971 and his mother’s maiden name is Agnes Att-ah while Kwabena Adu Gyamfi was born on 30th December 1969 and his mother’s maiden name is Yaa Gyamfua. Once again, it is clear that the applicant, who describes himself as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng, used the two names independently and separately of each other in order to procure to Taxpayer Identification Numbers for reasons best known to him.
Additional evidence of the applicant’s use of the two names separately and independently can be seen in the fact that the applicant who describes himself as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng has used the name Kwabena Adu Gyamfi to procure, among others, a diplomatic passport which is yet to expire (See Exhibit 11), a Ghana Card (See exhibit 12) and a Voter Identity Card which was issued in 2020 (see exhibit 13). Other passports which were obtained in the name of Kwabena Adu Gyamfi have expired (See exhibits 8, 9 and 10).
There is further evidence of the fact that the applicant who says he is Kwabena Adu Gyamfi and that Victor Kusi Boateng is an alias possesses a Voter Identity Card which was issued in the Ashanti Region in 2016 (Exhibit 29); and a driver’s license which was issued on the 8th of April 2010 (Exhibit 30) all in the name, Victor Kusi Boateng.
Clearly the evidence before the court overwhelmingly demonstrates that the applicant who describes himself as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng uses two names independent of each other for different purposes and does so concurrently. In the opinion of the Court, Counsel for the 1st Respondent is justified when in his statement of case, he argues that “the name Victor Kusi Boateng which the supposed applicant refers to as his alias is not an alias. The name Victor Kusi Boateng is actually another identity actively used by the applicant”
In the face of such overwhelming evidence, the averment made by the applicant in his supplementary affidavit to the effect that he has been informed by his lawyer and verily believes same to be true that” per the laws of Ghana, the fact that a person can be identified by two different sets of names is not a crime and such a person will not be denied the protection of his fundamental human rights enshrined in the 1992 constitution by virtue of the fact that he is identified by two different sets of names” is, in the view of the court, completely misconceived.
This is because the evidence placed before this court does not disclose a simple case of an individual who is identified by two different sets of names but rather, it discloses a case of an individual who deliberately uses two different identities in his public dealings either to conceal his true identity, to exploit a loophole in the law or for whatever reason best known to him, such that but for the revelations made by the 1st Respondent, it would be difficult for any public institution or person dealing with the Applicant to relate one identity with the other.
The evidence before this court discloses a pattern of duplicity and lack of transparency on the part of the applicant which borders on criminality and the failure of applicant’s counsel to appreciate the import of his client’s conduct and to advise him appropriately is unfortunate, to say the least.
[90) As was stated earlier, this court has had to painstakingly comb through the totality of the evidence before it in order to decipher the identity of the applicant who commenced this action because of the contention over his true identity. Having established that the applicant, who describes himself as Kwabena Adu Gyamfi alias Victor Kusi Boateng operates in two distinct and separate identities concurrently, the question which of the applicant’s two identities is the originator of this action is relevant as that will enable the court to make specific orders at the end of the case. In other words, the court must know whether the applicant before it is Kwabena Adu Gyamfi who was
born on 30th December 1969 and whose mother’s maiden name is Yaa Gyamfua or Victor Kusi Boateng who was born on 7th September 1971 and whose mother’s maiden name is Agnes Attah.
In his statement of case, counsel for the 1si respondent submits, on the issue of the applicant’s identity that “it is because of the applicant’s double identity that the second respondent sic refers to him as the supposed applicant. The reason is that Article 33(1) of the 1992 constitution on which the supposed applicant anchors his application before the court confers locus standi only on the person who has a personal and direct interest in the matter the reason for which they invoke the aforesaid constitutional provision.”
He continues thus: “Article 33(1) of the 1992 constitution therefore provides thus; “33. Protection of rights by the Courts
(1) “where a person alleges that a prov1s10n of this constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress. (emphasis supplied)”
Counsel for 151 respondent further submits that in the case of FEDYAG V PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES OF GHANA [2010] SGLR 265 the Supreme Court, per Sophia Adinyira JSC (as she then was) held that under Article 33(1) which deals with protection of Human Rights and Freedoms and other rights by the courts, the personal interest requirement is a prerequisite condition for standing which would enable a plaintiff to enforce his human rights and freedoms.
The court notes that in a host of cases including FEDYAG V PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES OF GHANA [2010] SGLR 265; ADJEI-AMPOFO V ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY & ATTORNEY GENERAL ( NO 1) (2007-2008) SCGLR 611; NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY V ATTORNEY-GENERAL (CIBA CASE) 1996-97 SCGLR 729 AND SAM (NO. 2) V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
[2000) SCGLR 305, the distinction between the High Court’s jurisdiction to enforce fundamental human rights and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to declare an act to be in contravention of or inconsistent with the Constitution per article 2(1) of the 1922 Constitution has been discussed. With particular reference to the case of Sam (No.2) v Attorney-General supra, the Supreme Court speaking through Bamford Addo JSC (as she then was) stated that:
“However under Article 33(1) which deals with protection of Human Rights and Freedoms and other rights by the courts, the personal interest requirement is a prerequisite condition for standing which would enable a plaintiff to enforce his Human Rights and Freedoms. The said article 33 (1) reads:
“33 (1) Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress.”(The emphasis mine)
The words in “relation to him” and “that person” imply that a plaintiff must have personal interest in the litigation. Therefore it is only when a person seeks the enforcement of his fundamental human rights and freedom that he ought to have “personal interest” in the case and this would invariably mean that there must have arisen a controversy or dispute concerning an infringement or intended infringement of the plaintiff’s said rights which he seeks to enforce through the High Court.” (Emphasis Mine)
In the recent case of SPRINGFIELD EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION LTD VRS ENI GHANA EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION LTD AND VITOL UPSTREAM GHANA LIMITED UNREPORTED SUIT NO Hl/91/2022 DATED 29TH JUNE 2023, the Court of Appeal speaking through His Lordship Ackaah-Boafo, JA explained the distinction between capacity and locus standi in the following terms;
“Legal capacity to initiate an action and continue with same refers to the plaintiffs status as a legal person. Capacity is not about the role of a party in the proceeding but to the party’s personal characteristics or status while standing is part of the larger subject of entitlement to seek judicial relief before a court of competent jurisdiction. Standing involves the acknowledgement of one’s right to come before the court to argue that his or her right has been violated or to enforce an unfulfilled obligation. Put another way standing involves the determination of whether or not a person has sufficient stake in the outcome of a matter to enable the one set in motion the judicial process. See Professor Hogg Observation in Constitutional law of Canada (3rd ed. 1992 at 1263”
This court deduces from the above statement of the law that a person’s identity must first be disclosed and known to enable the court determine whether he or she has the requisite capacity to initiate an action or has standing in the matter.
The law is that when a party lacks capacity, or locus standi, the court ought not to deal with the merits of the case. See the case of EBUSUAPANYIN YAW STEPHENS VRS KWESI APOH [2010] 2 MLRG where the Supreme Court, speaking through Anin Yeboah JSC (as he then was), reiterated the legal position that if an action succeeds on a plea of limitation, lack of jurisdiction, or lack of locus standi, the Trial Court and for that matter the Appellate Court should not proceed to determine the merits of the case irrespective of the evidence. See also: AKRONG V BULLEY 1965 GLR 469.
Applying the law to facts of this case, this court is of the view that the issue of the exact identity of the applicant before the court relates to both the legal capacity of the applicant to maintain the instant action and his locus standi. This is because firstly, the court must be clear in its mind which of the applicant’s two names which, as has been demonstrated above, represent two separate and distinct identities, is the originator of this action. Based on the above analysis, it is not clear to the court, the specific identity in which the applicant prosecutes the instant application, as there is a person with two distinct identities presenting himself as the applicant before this court. Consequently,there is no identifiable person with capacity to maintain the instant action. Therefore same is dismissed.
Having regard to the nature of the issue raised in this application, the fact that 1st respondent engaged counsel and the voluminous submissions filed by counsel for 1st respondent, costs of GHS10,000 is awarded against applicant in favour of 1st respondent.